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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brandon Savage appeals, pro se, from the judgment entered upon the district 
court's order denying his request for the appointment of counsel and summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court set forth the factual and procedural background of both the 
underlying criminal case and the post-conviction proceedings, as follows: 
Following a plea of guilty to Possession of Sexually Exploitative 
Material in Canyon County Case No. CR-2007-14455, Petitioner Brandon 
Savage was sentenced to a unified term of incarceration of ten years, with 
the first three years fixed. Execution of the sentence was suspended, and 
petitioner was placed on probation for ten years. The Judgment was 
entered January 30, 2008. No appeal was filed. 
On January 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief in Canyon County Case No. CV-2009-1204, alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to advise him of his right 
not to participate in a psycho-sexual evaluation and to consult with an 
attorney during the evaluation process. The district court ultimately 
determined that Petitioner was entitled to relief and Petitioner was to be 
resentenced. After resentencing, an amended judgment was entered on 
August 3, 2011. Petitioner was again sentenced to a unified term of 
incarceration of ten years, with the first three years fixed. As before, 
execution of the sentence was suspended and Petitioner was placed on 
probation for ten years. No appeal was filed. Petitioner was subsequently 
found to have violated the terms of his probation on two occasions and his 
probation was revoked and reinstated. Petitioner was thereafter found to 
have violated the terms of his probation a third time and on November 24, 
2014, the Court ordered execution of Petitioner's sentence. 
Petitioner appealed, contending that the district court abused its 
discretion by ordering execution of the original sentence rather than 
retaining jurisdiction or reinstating probation. The decision of the district 
court was affirmed in State v. Savage, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 688 
(October 30, 2015). Petitioner also filed additional motions pursuant to 
1 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The first, on December 19, 2014, sought a 
reduction of sentence based on leniency and also credit for time served; 
the second also sought credit for time served while on probation. The 
Court denied the motions. 
On October 17, 2016, Petitioner filed a third Rule 35 motion for 
relief. In this motion Petitioner alleged that his sentence was illegal 
because Idaho Code § 18-1507 A, the code section under which he was 
convicted, was repealed and replaced following his conviction. 
Specifically, in 2012, the legislature repealed LC. § 18-1507A and 
amended § 18-1507 to include the information previously contained in 
§ 18-1507 A. A new § 18-1507 A was then passed, which established a 
crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means, which does not 
pertain to him. In denying the motion, this Court determined that Mr. 
Savage was convicted pursuant to a statute in effect both at the time at the 
time [sic] he committed the act at issue and at the time of his conviction 
and that the conviction was therefore valid. See LC.§ 67-513. The Court 
further determined that the crime for which the Defendant was convicted, 
Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material, remains a crime in the State 
of Idaho, and in 2012, the crime was simply moved from § 18-1507 A to § 
18-1507. The Court explained that the fact that the code section changed 
in 2012 is of no import when it is clear that Defendant was convicted of 
[a] crime that was in continuous effect at the time of the acts through the 
present. The Rule 35 motion was therefore denied. A copy of the decision 
is attached hereto. 
On June 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-
conviction relief, Canyon County Case No. CV-16-5781. The Petition in 
that case was withdrawn without prejudice. 
On October 11, 2016, Petitioner filed the present action, his third 
pro se verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief, wherein he alleges that 
his conviction is illegal because the code section under which he was 
convicted was repealed and amended and no longer applies to him. This 
argument mirrors the argument presented, and rejected, in the criminal 
action. 
Petitioner also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The 
state objected to the request for counsel pursuant to Murphy v. State, 156 
Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), reh 'g denied (July 1, 2014). 
Contemporaneous to this objection, the State filed a motion for summary 
dismissal on the grounds that this case is an impermissible successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. On January 26, 2017, the State filed a 
supplemental motion for summary dismissal asserting the Petitioner failed 
to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that the doctrine of 
2 
res judicata bars the claim presented. Mr. Savage filed his pro se response 
to the supplemental motion on February 22, 2017. 
(R., pp.114-16 (footnoted omitted).) 
Following a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal (see R., p.2), the 
district court entered an Order Denying Appointment of Counsel and Granting Summary 
Dismissal (R., pp.114-26). The court found the allegations in the petition failed to raise 
even the possibility of a valid claim because the petition was untimely and because the 
claim therein-that Savage's conviction and sentence were illegal because the statute 
under which he had been convicted was repealed and amended-was barred by res 
judicata and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R., pp.116-20.) 
The court entered a Final Judgment of dismissal, from which Savage timely appealed. 
(R., pp.127-33.) Savage also filed a motion for the appointment of appellate counsel, 
which the district court denied. (R., pp.134-37, 145-47.) 
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ISSUE 
Savage's Appellant's Brief does not contain a "short and concise" statement of the 
issues on appeal, as required by I.AR. 35(a)(4). (See Appellant's Brief, p.5.) The state 
phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Savage failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his request 




Savage Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His Request 
For Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Untimely, Successive Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Savage filed his third post-conviction petition on October 11, 2016, more than 
eight years after the entry of the initial judgment and more than five years after the entry 
of the amended judgment filed in his criminal case. (R., pp.4, 114-15.) The district court 
denied Savage's motion for the appointment of counsel and granted the state's motion for 
summary dismissal, finding that the petition was not timely and that the claim therein was 
both barred by res judicata and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
(R., pp.114-26.) Savage challenges the court's order denying counsel and summarily 
dismissing his petition but, in doing so, he merely repeats the arguments he made below 
and does not address the district court's rulings. (See, generally, Appellant's brief.) This 
Court should affirm the district court's order on the unchallenged bases that the petition 
was not timely and that the claim therein was barred by res judicata and failed to state a 
claim for relief. This Court may also affirm the court's order on the alternative basis, 
argued by the state below, that the petition was an impermissible successive petition. 
B. Standards Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed 
by LC. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel 
lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 
5 
102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe 
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Kelly v. State, 149 
Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). 
When the basis for a trial court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, the appellate 
court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 
956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Savage Has Failed To Challenge Any Of The Bases Upon Which The District 
Court Denied His Request For Counsel And Dismissed His Petition And, As 
Such, Has Failed To Show Any Error 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. LC. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,522, 164 P.3d 
798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative, if the 
applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. State, 
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, 
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allegations in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining 
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
When a post-conviction petitioner requests counsel and "alleges facts showing the 
possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on the defendant's 
behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist the petitioner in 
developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 
(2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If, on the other hand, the claims 
in the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they could be 
developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and further 
investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the usual 
procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman, 144 Idaho at 
529, 164 P.3d at 809; Hust, 147 Idaho at 684,214 P.3d at 670. 
Applying the foregoing principles, the district court denied Savage's motion for 
the appointment of counsel and summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition because 
the petition was untimely and the claim therein was barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
and otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R., pp.114-26.) 
Savage argues the district court erred (see Appellant's brief, p.6), but he has failed to 
address, much less challenge with argument and authority, any of the bases for the district 
court's rulings (see, generally. Appellant's brief). Because Savage has not even 
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addressed the district court's rulings, much less identified any alleged error in the court's 
reasons for dismissal, the court's order denying counsel and summarily dismissing 
Savage's petition must be affirmed. Goodwin, 131 Idaho at 366-67, 956 at 1313-14 (trial 
court's rulings will be affirmed on unchallenged bases); see also Stewart v. Sun Valley 
Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004) ("Error is never presumed on appeal 
and the burden of showing it is on the party alleging it." (quotations omitted)); Farrell v. 
Board of Com'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378,390, 64 P.3d 304,316 (2002) (appellant 
carries burden of showing error on record and error never presumed); State v. Mowrey, 
128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (appellant has burden of showing error in 
record). Alternatively, this Court should affirm the district court's order on the merits of 
the district court's rulings set forth in its Order Denying Appointment of Counsel and 
Granting Summary Dismissal (see R., pp.114-26 (Appendix A)), which the state adopts 
as part of its argument on appeal. 
D. This Court May Also Affirm The District Court's Order Denying Counsel And 
Summarily Dismissing Savage's Post-Conviction Petition On The Alternative 
Basis That The Petition Was An Impermissible Successive Petition 
The state moved to dismiss Savage's post-conviction petition on the bases that it 
was untimely and successive. (R., pp.31-33.) The district court found the petition was 
untimely (see R., pp.116-17) but concluded it was not impermissibly successive (see R., 
pp.119-20). Correct application of the law, however, shows the petition was, in fact, 
impermissibly successive. This Court may therefore affirm the district court's order 
denying counsel and summarily dismissing Savage's petition on this alternative basis. 
See Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,676,227 P.3d 925,930 (2010) (an order of summary 
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dismissal may be affirmed on appeal on the grounds asserted in the state's motion to 
dismiss if no material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record); Baxter v. 
State, 149 Idaho 859, 864-865, 243 P.3d 675, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2010) (same). 
A successive petition for post-conviction relief is generally not permissible. LC. § 
19-4908 ( claims not raised in initial post-conviction proceedings generally waived). Only 
in cases where the petitioner can show "sufficient reason" why claims were "inadequately 
presented in the original case" may he have the opportunity to re-litigate them. Griffin v. 
State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 
LC. § 19-4908. An analysis of whether "sufficient reason" exists to file a successive 
petition includes an analysis of whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable time" 
after the petitioner's discovery of the factual basis for the claim. Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). "In determining what a reasonable time is 
for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, 
as has been done in capital cases." Id. at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
Although the district court recognized Savage's October 2016 petition was 
"technically a successive petition for post-conviction relief' (R., p.119), it concluded the 
petition was not impermissibly successive because the claim therein - that a 2009 
amendment to the statute under which Savage was charged rendered his conviction and 
sentence illegal - "could not have been raised" in his initial post-conviction petition (R., 
pp.119-20). Even assuming the truth of the latter proposition, Savage's October 2016 
petition was still barred by LC. § 19-4908. As set forth above, an analysis of whether a 
"sufficient reason" exists to file a successive petition necessarily requires consideration of 
whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable time" of the discovery of the factual 
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basis of the claim. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. Savage filed the 
post-conviction petition at issue in this case more than seven years after the 2009 
amendment to the statute that formed the basis of his claim for post-conviction relief. 
Because Savage did not allege, much less demonstrate, that the seven-year delay was 
reasonable, he failed to show he filed his successive petition within a "reasonable time" 
of the discovery of his claim and, thus, necessarily failed to show any "sufficient reason" 
for bringing his successive petition. The court's order denying counsel and summarily 
dismissing Savage's post-conviction petition should be affirmed on this alternative basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the district 
court's order denying the appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing Savage's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2017. 
/s/ Lori A. Fleming 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CASE NO. CV 2016-10012*C 
ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Following a plea of guilty to Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material in Canyon 
County Case No. CR-2007-14455, Petitioner Brandon Savage was sentenced to a unified term of 
incarceration of ten years, with the first three years fixed. Execution of the sentence was 
suspended, and petitioner was placed on probation for ten years. The Judgment was entered 
January 30, 2008. No appeal was filed. 
On January 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Canyon 
County Case No. CV-2009-1204, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's 
failure to advise him of his right not to participate in a psycho-sexual evaluation and to consult 
with an attorney during the evaluation process. The district court ultimately determined that 
Petitioner was entitled to relief and Petitioner was to be resentenced. After resentencing, an 
amended judgment was entered on August 3, 2011. Petitioner was again sentenced to a unified 
term of incarceration of ten years, with the first three years fixed. As before, execution of the 
sentence was suspended and Petitioner was placed on probation for ten years. No appeal was 
filed. Petitioner was subsequently found to have violated the terms of his probation on two 
occasions and his probation was revoked and reinstated. Petitioner was thereafter found to have 
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violated the terms of his probation a third time and on November 24, 2014, the Court ordered 
execution of Petitioner's sentence. 
Petitioner appealed, contending that the district court abused its discretion by ordering 
execution of the original sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction or reinstating probation. The 
decision of the district court was affirmed in State v. Savage, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 688 
(October 30, 2015). Petitioner also filed additional motions pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. 
The first, on December 19, 2014, sought a reduction of sentence based on leniency and also 
credit for time served; the second also sought credit for time served while on probation. The 
Court denied the motions. 
On October 17, 2016, Petitioner filed a third Rule 35 motion for relief. In this motion 
Petitioner alleged that his sentence was illegal because Idaho Code §18-1507A, the code section 
under which he was convicted, was repealed and replaced following his conviction. Specifically, 
in 2012, the legislature repealed I.C. §18-1507A and amended §18-1507 to include the 
information previously contained in §18-1507A. A new §18-1507A was then passed, which 
established a crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means, which does not pertain 
to him. In denying the motion, this Court determined that Mr. Savage was convicted pursuant to 
a statute in effect both at the time at the time he committed the act at issue and at the time of his 
conviction and that the conviction was therefore valid. See I.C. § 67-513. The Court further 
determined that the crime for which the Defendant was convicted, Possession of Sexually 
Exploitative Material, remains a crime in the State of Idaho, and in 2012, the crime was simply 
moved from §18-1507A to §18-1507. The Court explained that the fact that the code section 
changed in 2012 is of no import when it is clear that Defendant was convicted of crime that was 
in continuous effect at the time of the acts through the present. The Rule 35 motion was therefore 
denied. A copy of the decision is attached hereto1 
On June 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, Canyon 
County Case No. CV-16-5781. The Petition in that case was withdrawn without prejudice. 
1 The Court also denied a motion for summary judgment that Mr. Savage brought with respect to his Rule 35 
motion. 
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On October 11, 2016, Petitioner filed the present action, his third pro se verified Petition 
for Post-Conviction relief, wherein he alleges that his conviction is illegal because the code 
section under which he was convicted was repealed and amended and no longer applies to him. 
This argument mirrors the argument presented, and rejected, in the criminal action. 
Petitioner also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The State objected to the 
request for counsel pursuant to Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), reh'g 
denied (July 1, 2014). Contemporaneous to this objection, the State filed a motion for summary 
dismissal on the grounds that this case is an impermissible successive petition for post-
conviction relief. On January 26, 2017, the State filed a supplemental motion for summary 
dismissal asserting the Petitioner failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that 
the doctrine of res judicata bars the claim presented. Mr. Savage filed his prose response to the 
supplemental motion on February 22, 2017. 
I. Motion to Appoint Counsel 
A petitioner in a civil post-conviction proceeding is not constitutionally or statutorily 
entitled to appointment of counsel if he cannot afford to hire an attorney. Fields v. State, 135 
Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000); Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365, 
371 (2014). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies 
within the discretion of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 at 792, 102 P.3d 
1108 at 1111 (2004). Within the parameters of this discretion, where facts are alleged that give 
rise to the possibility of a valid claim, a court should appoint counsel. Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). As set forth below, there is no possibility of a valid claim in this 
case, and the Court therefore declines to appoint counsel. 
A. The Claim is Untimely 
First, the Court notes that this Petition is untimely. Generally, a post-conviction claim 
based upon the statute underlying a conviction must be brought within one year plus forty-two 
days from the date the judgment was entered. In this case, the applicable judgment was entered 
August 3, 2011, which makes the deadline for filing a claim September 14, 2012. The Court 
takes judicial notice that the statutory amendments at issue here went into effect July 1, 2012. 
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Petitioner has not demonstrated why this issue could not have been raised prior to the September 
14, 2012 deadline. Assuming for purposes of argument that the Petitioner had one year after the 
statutory amendments went into effect in which to file a claim, the deadline for filing the claim 
expired in 2013. The present petition was not filed until October of 2016, several years beyond 
the deadline for bringing the claim. Even if the applicable time period is not one year, but rather 
whether the claim was asserted within a reasonable period of time, the court finds that four years 
is not reasonable under the circumstances of this case. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 
P.3d at 875. As Petitioner does not demonstrate any facts that could justify equitable tolling, the 
Court finds that the petition is untimely.2 
B. The Claim is Barred Pursuant to the Doctrine of res iudicata 
The Claim presented is barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata 
precludes re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or decision 
in another action between the same litigants. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 
482 (2000). Thus, a valid final judgment or post-judgment decision rendered on the merits is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same claim. Hindmarsh v. 
Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). The "sameness" of a claim for res judicata 
purposes is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two causes of action. 
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149, 804 P.2d 319, 322 (1990). "A valid and 
final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Id. at 150, 804 P.2d at 323. 
Therefore, res judicata's preclusive effect bars "not only subsequent re-litigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the same cause of 
action which were actually made or which might have been made" in the first suit. Hindmarsh, 
138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805; State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63,343 P.3d 497,505 (2015). 
2 Although the Court found this case is untimely, this finding goes only to Mr. Savage's request 
for appointment of counsel. The case is not dismissed as untimely as the issue was not addressed 
by the parties with respect to the motion for summary dismissal. 
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The rationale behind res judicata has been set forth as follows: 
[The] expectation that entire controversies will be presented and that all relevant 
material will be produced has long been the rule in Idaho: 'We think the correct 
rule to be that in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to 
every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim But also as to 
every matter which might or should have been litigated in the first suit.' 
(Emphasis added.) Joyce v. Murphy Land Etc. Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 
241, 242 (1922)." Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 556, 569 P.2d 358, 360 
(1977). 
Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 603 P.2d 1005 (1979). The same rationale that there should be 
some finality to litigation is also found in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, LC. § 19-
4908. 
Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that the claim presented by Mr. Savage arose out 
of the same transaction as Mr. Savage's most recent Rule 35 motion: his sentencing and the 
subsequent legislative restructuring. The Court also finds that the issues presented in the present 
action and the most recent Rule 35 are identical: whether the legislative restructuring rendered 
Mr. Savage's sentence illegal. The parties are also the same. The order denying Mr. Savage's 
Rule 35 motion was issued December 23, 2016. He had forty-two days from that date in which to 
file an appeal. He failed to do so. The decision is therefore final. Because that order decided the 
issues presented in this case, and that decision is final, the doctrine of res judicata precludes Mr. 
Savage from reasserting that claim here. See State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9, 966 P.2d 1, 9 
(1998); See also State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 62,343 P.3d 497,504 (2015). 
C. The Petition Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted 
Even if the claim were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata the claims made by Mr. 
Savage fail on the merits. The claims made and the operational facts in the present action are 
identical to those made in the criminal case. 
ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 5 
-- --
Mr. Savage was originally convicted of possession of sexually exploitative material 
pursuant to I.C. §18-1507A. In 2012, the legislature repealed LC. §18-1507A and amended §18-
1507 to incorporate the language previously contained in § 18-1507 A, including the language 
setting forth the crime of possession of exploitative material. A new §18-1507A was then 
enacted, which established a crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means. Mr. 
Savage's criminal act does not fall within the parameters of the new §18-1507A. Mr. Savage's 
argument is that this change to § 18-1507 A has the effect of making his conviction illegal. 
The order denying Rule 35 relief in CR-2007-14455 is attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
hereby incorporated and the decision and reasoning adopted. As the Court pointed out in that 
order, the sentence is valid pursuant to Idaho Code §67-513. Additionally, the legislature's act 
of moving a crime from one section to another, in this case from §l8-1507A to §18-1507 does 
not negate the validity of the conviction nor does it result in an improper ex post facto law. The 
act of possession of sexually exploitative material continues to encompass the act for which Mr. 
Savage was convicted and the penalty remains unchanged. The specific elements detailing that 
crime were not eliminated; rather they were simply incorporated into §18-1507. Given this, the 
Court finds that Mr. Savage fails to set forth a claim recognized by LC. §19-4901 
For the above reasons, the Court finds the Petition does not give rise to the possibility of 
a valid claim. His request for counsel is therefore denied. 
IL State's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
The State moves to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is an impermissible 
successive petition, that Petitioner failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and 
that the claim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 
Although the present action is technically a successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
the code changes were not made until after the 2009 Petition was entirely resolved. If an initial 
post-conviction action was timely filed and has been concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent 
application outside of the one-year limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted 
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application. LC. § 19-4908; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 
904, 174 P.3d 870,874 (2007). Thus, because the claim in this action could not have been raised 
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in the 2009 petition, it is not an impermissible successive petition relative to the first petition for 
post-conviction relief. This case is likewise not an impermissible successive petition with 
respect to the second petition for post-conviction relief that was filed in June of 2016. The 
petition in that case was withdrawn without prejudice. The mere existence of that case does not 
act as a bar to the present action. For these reasons, the State's motion to dismiss the petition on 
the grounds that it is an impermissible successive petition is denied. 
The State's next two bases for dismissal, that Petitioner failed to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted and that the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, are related. As 
the Court set forth in detail above, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable in this case as the 
parties in the criminal case were the same and the issue that was adjudicated to final resolution is 
identical. The State's motion on this ground is therefore granted. 
The State's assertion that Mr. Savage failed to state a claim for which relief can be 
granted, goes to the heart of the Court's ruling on the Rule 35 motion. Again, the analysis of this 
issue is set forth in some detail above. Also as set forth above, the Court hereby adopts and 
incorporates its decision and reasoning in the criminal case, CR-2007-14455, and applies it to the 
current matter. The State's Motion to Dismiss due to failure to state a claim is granted. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons as set forth above, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED 
and the State's motion for summary dismissal is GRANTED. 
DA TED this \$"'day of March, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF CANYON ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was forwarded to 
the following: 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Brandon E. Savage 
In Mate No. 88078 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, or by personal service. 
DATED this \~'\i\day of March, 2017. 
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Chris Yamamoto, 
Cle~Mfilf"rt 
by Deputy Clerk of the Court 
-- -- F f L E D ---....,A.M ____ ,P.M. 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON EUGENE SAVAGE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR-2007-14455 
) 
) 
) ORDER DENYING SUMMARY 




) ________________ ) 
Procedural History 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's third motion for relief pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Randall Grove appears on behalf of the Defendant; Anne Voss appears 
on behalf of the State ofldaho. The procedural history of this case is as follows: 
Following a plea of guilty to an amended charge of possession of sexually exploitative 
material pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-1507 A, Petitioner was sentenced to a unified term of 
incarceration of ten years, the first three of which were fixed. Execution of the sentence was 
suspended and Petitioner was placed on probation for a period of ten years. Judgment was 
entered on January 30, 2008. Petitioner thereafter filed a filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
relief - Canyon County Case No. CV-09-1204. Ultimately, the Petition was granted and the 
court ordered that Mr. Savage be resentenced. Thereafter, the sentencing judge recused herself 
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and a new judge was assigned to preside over the case. A new pre-sentence investigation report 
and psycho-sexual evaluation were ordered. After a new sentencing hearing was held, an 
Amended Judgment was entered on August 3, 2011, again sentencing the Defendant to a unified 
term of incarceration of ten years, the first three of which were fixed. Execution of the sentence 
was also suspended once again, and the Defendant was placed on probation for a period of ten 
years. 
The Defendant was subsequently found to have violated the terms of his probation, and 
on April 6, 2012, an order was entered revoking and reinstating probation. In 2013, the 
Defendant was again found to be in violation of the terms of his probation. A second order on 
probation violation was entered on November 13, 2013 revoking and reinstating probation and 
extending it for a period of two years. On October 29, 2014, the court found that Petitioner 
violated the terms of his probation a third time, and as a result, on November 24, 2014, a Second 
Amended Judgment was entered whereupon the sentence previously suspended was imposed. 
The Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court in 
State v. Savage, Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion 688 (Oct. 30, 2015). 
Along with his appeal, the Defendant filed a motion for leniency and credit for time 
served pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35). The order denying Rule 35 relief was 
entered December 23, 2014. The Defendant thereafter filed a second motion for Rule 35 relief 
alleging his sentence was illegal due to the failure of the Idaho Department of Correction to 
provide appropriate medical treatment. The Court issued an order denying the motion on March 
25, 2016. 
The Defendant has now filed a third Rule 35 motion, again alleging his sentence is 
illegal. In the present motion, Defendant alleges his sentenced is illegal because, in 2012, the 
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legislature repealed LC. §18-1507A and amended §18-1507 to include the information 
previously contained in § 18-1507 A. A new § 18-1507 A was then passed, which established a 
crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means, which does not pertain to him. 
Defendant argues that because § 18-1507 A, the code section under which he was convicted, was 
repealed and replaced with a different crime, that his conviction pursuant to that statute is illegal. 
The State objects to the Rule 35 motion, asserting that the statutory amendment was not 
an improper ex post facto law. The State further points out that in 2012, when § 18-1507 A was 
repealed, § 18-1507 was simultaneously amended to include the penalties previously contained in 
§18-1507A. 
Analysis 
Idaho Code§ 67-513 sets forth: 
The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the 
prosecution and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so 
repealed, unless the intention to bar such prosecution and punishment is expressly 
declared in the repealing act. 
The acts which constitute the nature of the crime for which Defendant was convicted 
occurred in 2006 and 2007. Defendant was convicted in 2011 upon entry of the Amended 
Judgment under Idaho Code § 18-1507A as written. This was prior to the statute's repeal or 
replacement or any legislative amendments enacted in 2012. Thus, references to Idaho Code § 
18-1507A in the Second Amended Judgment entered November 24, 2014, are appropriate as 
they reference the law in place at the time of the Defendant's conviction in 2011. Further, there 
is no indication in the 2012 re-codification that the legislature intended to void prior prosecutions 
under Idaho Code§ 18-1507A as written at the time of Defendant's conviction. 
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RULE 35 RELIEF - 3 
-- --
Moreover, the crime for which the Defendant was convicted, Possession of Sexually 
Exploitative Material, remains a crime in the State of Idaho and the crime has simply been 
moved from §18-1507A to §18-1507.1 At the time of Defendant's conviction, Idaho Code§ 18-
1507 A made it a crime to knowingly and willfully possess sexually exploitative material. 
Subsequent to the 2012 amendments, that same act is now criminalized in §18-1507(2)(a). The 
fact that the code section changed in 2012 is of no import when the prior judgments and the 
specific crime identified by name make it clear that Defendant was convicted of the crime of 
Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material. For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's 
Rule 35 motion is without merit and must be denied. 
Additionally, contemporaneously with his Rule 35 motion, the Defendant filed a motion 
for summary judgment as to his Rule 35 motion. The State did not respond. A motion for 
summary judgment is made pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. 56. There is 
no corresponding criminal rule. As such, a motion for summary judgment is not appropriate in 
the context of a criminal case and will be denied. 
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment and motion for Rule 35 relief are DENIED. 
Dated: December~' 2016. JUDGE 
DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE 
Davis F. V anderVelde 
District Judge 
1 The acts which constitute the crime have also been expanded, however that is not at issue here. 
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